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is a recent thing born in the nineteenth century. In fact,
I believe that a sizable number of the ancient
philosophers were either themselves vegetarian or
thought highly of vegetarianism (Pythagoras,
. Empedocles, Plato, Theophrastus, Seneca, Ovid,
.Plutarch, Plotinus, Porphyry, etc.). Along with Judith
Barad, I think that ancient concern for animals, if not
for vegetarianism, lasted well into the medieval period,S
although it must be admitted that (Aristotelian)
anthropocentrism was not unknown in antiquity, and it
was even more prominent in the middle ages than in
the ancient period.
Appreciation for the best in the pre-modem world,
however, is not the same as anti-modernism. Study of
the ancient world, in general, and of ancient attitudes
toward animals, in particular, reveals that: (1) the
commendable modem concentration on rights, and on
the development of liberation movements based on
the rights of racial minorities, women, and animals,
were not pre-modern phenomena, hence there is a
certain superiority to the modem period over the premodern one; and (2) the modern commodification of
animals and the view of nature as inert material
resource creates exploitation of animals never dreamt
of in antiquity. That is, both the ancient and medieval
worlds, on the one hand, and the modern and
contemporary worlds, on the other, should be taken
with several grains of salt.

Whenever I have most carefully revised my
moral (or philosophical) standards, I am
always able to see... that at best I have been
finding out, in some new light, the true
meaning that was latent in old traditions.
...Revision does not mean mere destruction.
Josiah Royce l
Although I am not a Royce scholar, it is this
quotation that best sums up my efforts regarding animal
rights issues, in particular, and regarding philosophic
issues, in general. All of the seemingly non-traditional
positions I have at one point or another defended are
rooted in the work I have done interpreting traditional
sources in the history of Platonism and in the history of
religious thought. My views (regarding animal rights,
theism, pacifism, 2 transcendentalism, mysticism, 3
romanticism) can be referred to as neoclassical. They
are "neo" precisely because they are built on a careful
consideration of "classical" sources.
Two works of mine illustrate the quotation from
Royce with respect to animal rights issues. The first,
The Philosophy of Vegetarianism,4 is an attempt to
rethink the widespread belief that concern for animals
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I should note that the title to The Philosophy of
Vegetarianism is defective in that it gives no indication

hyperbolizing here, but it is nonetheless true that I
have never altered my view of any serious matter as
quickly and as decisively as I did regarding animal
rights (Singer would perhaps say "rights") upon
reading Singer's book. He was so obviously correct, I
thought, that I should never eat meat nor wear leather
again. And I have not.
Autobiographical writings like the present one are
obvious occasions for self-deception or puffery.
Perhaps historians of philosophy Or historians of ideas
can mitigate these dangers by keeping in mind that
their erudition is always somewhat eclectic and
derivative. But it is precisely this eclecticism and
derivativeness, I think, that makes history pertinent.
Any thinker and writer who isnot an outright plagiarist
is at least somewhat original, but not even the great
thinkers are as original as their epigoni claim. I am
convinced that philosophical originality, in general,
and originality regarding animal rights issues, in
particular, does not so much consist in new elements
or conclusions as in the way in which previous
elements or conclusions are reticulated, in the way in
which the shards from the past-including the recent
past-are glued together into a new vessel. There are
a finite number of views on even complicated issues,
and one's job is to negotiate one's way through the
options, under the guidance of previous shipwrecks,
to the option that is the best available.
Thomas McFarland overstates the case a bit, but his
view is worth consideration:

of the fact that it is a book about ancient philosophy,
but the title does have the virtue (as the editor who
suggested the title promised it would) of getting
attention for the work. Forty-nine reviews of the book
have appeared in journals in any number of disciplines,
philosophy, classics, biology, etc., and the book has
received awards. Most of these reviews were positive,
but even the negative ones pleased me in that, as a
defender of Karl Popper's method of bold hypothesis
and severe refutation, I found that the attempted
refutations made me aware of where, say, my bold views
regarding Plato really were strong and where they
needed improvement. 6
The other work that illustrates the quotation from
Royce is my Hartshorne and the Metaphysics ofAnimal
Rights.? This book is an attempt to show that animal
rightist critiques of anthropocentrism are not only
consistent with but are actually required by religious
belief, in that such belief indicates some sort of
commitment to theocentrism rather than to anthropocentrism. Charles Hartshorne, the focus of this book,
provides an excellent example of the connection
between theism and anti-anthropocentrism in that he is
both one of the great metaphysicians and philosophers
of religion in the twentieth century as well as a noted
ornithologist. 8 For too long, theists, including
intelligent theists, have made God into something of
a tyrant and then imitated this supposed divine tyranny
in their own relations with animals. This book is an
attempt to rethink these issues.
From the above, one might assume that I was
originally led to an animal rights position due to a
. reading of some classic or other in the history of Greek
philosophy or in the history of religion. But this is not
the case. I was "converted" to the animal rights
movement by the thought of Peter Singer, whom I
assume is an atheist or agnostic. I read Animal
Liberation one day (literally) in 1979 and saw
ilmnediately that his position was correct, allhough I
did not share his utilitarianism. (I am now somewhat
less critical of utilitarianism. I should also note that the
argumentsfrom sentiency and marginal cases defended
by Singer were, as I later discovered, implicit ill several
Greek thinkers who were obviously not utilitarians.)
My present memory of the reading of this book is that
I digested all of the steps in all of Singer's arguments
in this 297 page book in one gulp. I am obviously
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What, indeed, do we all learn in the course of
a scholarly training, but the conventions and
gentilities of using other people's thoughts?
Some we encase in footnotes, some we read,
digest, and restate, some we simply regurgitate, but few people in this world, very few
indeed, really have more than a genuine idea
or two in a lifetime....We all know many
things, but only one or two of those things, or
none at all, originates with anyone of us. We
all stand on the shoulders of others-of our
predecessors and of our contemporaries-and
we rightly condemn those who attempt to
claim more. 9
Peter Singer is original as an interpreter of Bentham,
Mill, Sidgwick, and recent ethicists; Tom Regan is
brilliant in his use of Kant, Moore, and recent analytic
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philosophers; etc. Historians of philosophy or historians
of ideas are simply more explicit about their status as
derivative than thinkers like Singer and Regan, and they
are more aware of the fact that the desire for originality
itself has a history. It should be noted that the most
influential twentieth century philosophers have
attempted to wipe the slate clean and to do philosophy
from scratch (Moore, Wittgenstein, Russell, Husserl,
Heidegger-in a strange way), but it is by no means
clear that philosophy has progressed as much as these
ahistoricists have predicted it would as a consequence
of their mutually exclusive originalities. By way of
contrast, I would cite the enormous originality of
Whitehead in his self-proclaimed attempts to provide
several important footnotes to Plato. JO
Stephen R. L. Clark would, I assume, agree with
the above quotations from Royce and McFarland, but
he would incorporate them within a conservative
political program wherein enlightenment and universal
rights, including animal rights, are criticized. That is,
Clark's favorable attitude toward animals arises in a
MacIntyre-like way out of familial and parochial
attachments, as when he emphasizes the fact that he
is concerned primarily with British beasts. 11 My own
liberal, rights-oriented view is that rights themselves
are derived from traditional sources, say from the
divine concern for individual souls evidenced in
medieval thinkers, and perhaps also in ancient ones.
Hence, in one sense my views of animals are closer to
Clark's than to those of any other thinker in that both
of us make claims that are rooted in the history of
philosophy and both of us philosophize in a context
of religious belief, but in another sense my (historically
conditioned) liberalism puts me very much at odds
with Clark's conservative thought. It is necessary that
we start from some historical condition or other when
we think (about animals or about anything else), but
the sufficient conditions of any thinker's written work
can only be supplied by decisions on the part of the
thinker regarding how to react to those historical
conditions (including, at times, the decision to reiterate
the past in the present).
Thus far I have not indicated very much about my
personal life except to say that my views and practices
regarding animals were transformed about sixteen years
ago. Prior to that I was, naturally enough, born. This
event occurred in 1953 in Philadelphia. My roots are in
rough, lower middle class (at best) neighborhoods
(Frankford, Bridesburg) in a rough city. I doubt if there
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were very many animal rightists here, if only because
the human beings in these neighborhoods lived lives
only marginally better than those of animals in our
culture. Three of my four grandparents worked fulltime as children, one from the age of eight in various
sweat-shops, despite the fact that each of them possessed
remarkable natural intelligence. FDR was something
of a demigod in our house.
Through heroic efforts on the part on my parents I
was (positively) deracinated, to the extent that this is
possible, and I learned two crucial lessons: (1) I was
loved by them (to this day I am on a regular basis told
by people that I seem to be the happiest person they
know; make of this what you will); and (2) reading is
the only way out of destitution if you are not a great
athlete. I was good enough in athletics to be a high
school star and a college player but not talented enough
to go very far with a professional offer to play in the
Mets organization. I have been reading ever since and
playing pickup basketball. From athletics I have learned
at least this much: defeats (even defeats in the effort to
get fair treatment of animals) are not ultimate; in
competitive athlein there is always a playful element
of desporter. 12
Three teachers of mine have influenced me most.
One was a high school history teacher named Leonard
Blostic, who as a Franciscan no doubt prepared the way
for my later views regarding animals. A second was
Erling Skorpen at the University of Maine, a latter-day
Socrates who introduced me to philosophy. And the
third was a graduate school teacher named Leonard
Eslick, an ethereal Platonist and Whiteheadian who
defined "body" as "frozen thought." All three of these
have enhanced not only my elan vital but also my zest
for the intellectual life, in particular.
Buoyant personalities like mine are always open to
the charge of superficiality, in that the suffering that is
widespread in the world should, it is alleged, dissuade
one from optimism. But, to paraphrase Wordsworth,
listening to the sad music of sentient life is not
necessarily· to despair; it is still possible to urge that
"We will grieve not, rather find, strength in what remains
behind." In any event, not everyone finds me buoyant
and happy; university administrators almost always
dislike me, a fact which I wear as a badge of honor.
I do very little that is above and beyond the call of
duty regarding animals, say like the supererogatory
efforts of Lawrie and Susan Finsen to save strays.
But I do perform my duty by not eating, wearing,
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experimenting on, ...animals, and I do love to take long
hikes in the mountains with "my" mutt Porterhouse. I
also enjoy letting the cat into the house from the garage
every morning at five (a time which Thoreau describes
as "a cheerful invitation to make ... life of equal
simplicity, and I may say innocence, with Nature").
There is something correct in Clark's critique of the
philosophical tendency toward moral abstractions
that are not rooted in some concrete familial or
communal life. On the one hand, I am at least
somewhat moral because I take seriously being a son,
brother, husband, father of two (ages fifteen and
twenty-one, the latter we adopted when he was ten
after a brutal youth), cohabitant with nonhuman
animals, and citizen. On the other hand, too much
concern for partial affections can lead to narrowmindedness, tendentiousness, or nationalism rather
than to universal concern for the rights of sentient
creatures. In my own personal case, it is precisely
because I was partially deracinated that I was able to
escape factory work, at best, or prison, at worst.
Both personal freedom and philosophical originality
are, on my view, additions to the definiteness of past
reality, 13 additions that can have the cumulative effect
of significant change. Once absolute determinism and
absolute freedom are rejected as defensible positions,
it is easy to see that a qualified determinism is nothing
other than a qualified indeterminism. As before, it is
necessary that we work with some past or other in the
effort to face the partial indeterminacy of the future.
In my own life I have gone from ignorance of animal
rights issues (yet a knowledge of Franciscanism) to
knowledge of these issues, from knowledge of these
issues to a defense of an animal rights stance, from
this defense to the confidence that treatment of animal
rights issues was intellectually respectable (and this
largely due to reading James Rachels and to hearing a
paper on zoos by Dale Jamieson), from a personal
conviction that a defense of animal rights was
intellectually respectable to the not quixotic hope that
all rational people will eventually find such a defense
convincing. Thinking in long stretches of time very
often has its advantages.
Those who think that, or act as if, it is "inevitable"
that our future treatment of animals mirror our past
treatment of them in effect have adopted a symmetrical
view of time: the present's relationship to the future is
every bit as determinate as the present's relationship to '
the past. (Hume, Russell, and some Buddhists seem to
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have a different, but an equally symmetrical, view: the
present's relationship to the past is every bit as
indeterminate as its relationship to the future.) My own
view is an asymmetrical one, hence the title to this
autobiography. We have a determinate relationship to
the past in that historical abuses of animals cannot be
undone; such abuses force one to admit that human
relations with animals will always be tragic for anyone
with memory. But the indeterminate relationship we
have to the future is not negligible for the simple reason
that the future is not here yet to be determined in detail.
This indeterminacy should, in the long run, bode well
for nonhuman animals.
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